Da New Sees World Report via Daniyel: Can the "MOAB" Save the Day against Iran's Chokehold over the Straight of Hormuz; for Trump, & Netanyahu Before or After the Upcoming Elections?

What has Trump been smoking out in MOAB?

Da New Sees World Reportvia Daniyel enEglin A.F.B. Florida10/20, 2026

What is The "MOAB" and Why are Western Media Presstitute Pundit's proclaiming it contains 'the Keys to Total Victory in the Straight of Hormuz, for 'The Western Alliance' of the U.S. Israel Saudi Arabia, and the GCC States in the War Against Iran, and its proxies of Ansar Allah, and Hezbollah?

What is the MOAB, when was it designed, and why?

The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), colloquially known as the "Mother of All Bombs," is a 21,600-pound (9,800 kg) satellite-guided conventional bomb.

Design & Purpose:
The :MOAB" was designed in 2002–2003 by the Air Force Research Laboratory. It served as a precision replacement for the Vietnam-era BLU-82 "Daisy Cutter" to project psychological terror and compel Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein to stop fighting.
Mechanics:
Most of its weight consists of an 18,700-pound H-6 explosive charge encased in thin aluminum. It is an air-burst weapon designed to detonate a few feet above the ground, redirecting its blast wave horizontally across surface areas to clear soft-to-medium targets, cave openings, and valleys.

USAF Aircraft Compatibility for the MOAB:

The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB)—commonly known as the "Mother of All Bombs"—can only be carried and delivered by specialized variants of the C-130 Hercules cargo/transport aircraft (primarily the MC-130 Combat Talon series).

Can a B-1B Lancer or B-2 Spirit deliver a MOAB?

No, neither the B-1B Lancer nor the B-2 Spirit can carry or deliver a MOAB.

While both are major strategic bombers in the U.S. Air Force inventory, they are fundamentally incompatible with the MOAB due to physical design and deployment mechanics:

Why the B-1B Lancer cannot: The B-1B utilizes internal rotary bomb bays and external hardpoints designed for conventional and cruise missiles. It is built as a supersonic, swept-wing heavy bomber and lacks the rear cargo ramp and large cabin space required to accommodate a 30-foot-long, 21,600-pound weapon.

Why the B-2 Spirit cannot: The B-2 is a flying-wing stealth bomber with internal bomb racks (such as the Rotary Launcher Assembly). While it can carry massive ordnance—including the 30,000-pound GBU-57 MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator), which is designed for heavy stealth bombers—its internal bomb bay configuration is optimized for drop-through bottom bay doors rather than rear cargo extraction.

How the MOAB is Actually Delivered:

Because of its immense size (roughly 30 feet long and weighing nearly 11 tons), the MOAB cannot fit inside standard internal bomber bays or launch off traditional aircraft wing pylons.

Instead, it functions like cargo:

The Setup: The weapon is loaded horizontally onto a specialized airdrop cradle resting on standard roller systems inside the cargo hold of an MC-130 transport plane.

The Drop: Over the target area, the cargo ramp opens, and a deployment/drogue parachute extracts the entire pallet and bomb assembly out of the back of the aircraft.

Separation: Once clear of the aircraft, the parachute falls away, the cradle separates from the munition, and the GPS-guided grid fins deploy to steer the bomb toward its surface target.

Housing and Storage of the GBU-43/B MOAB:

U.S. Manufacturing and Inventory: The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) was manufactured at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma. However, active operational stock and test units are managed through Air Force Materiel Command facilities, most notably associated with Eglin Air Force Base in Florida (where test models are also featured at the Air Force Armament Museum).

Strategic Stockpiling: Because the MOAB is a specialized, low-density conventional weapon (with only a small total production batch built), active inventory is typically maintained at strategic munitions storage depots or forward-deployed to designated regional U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) ammunition supply points rather than being broadly distributed across standard domestic bases.

Do Dyess AFB or Other S.A.C. Bases House the MOAB?

No. Dyess AFB and other historical Strategic Air Command (S.A.C.) bases do not house or handle the MOAB.

Dyess AFB (located in Abilene, Texas) is a major Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) base operating the B-1B Lancer and the C-130J Hercules. While its flightline handles tactical and strategic airlift, it is not a designated storage hub for oversized specialty ordnance like the MOAB.

Historical Context of S.A.C.: Strategic Air Command was dissolved in 1992. Its former heavy bomber bases (such as Barksdale AFB, Minot AFB, Whiteman AFB, or Dyess) are configured for nuclear deterrence missions, standard cruise missiles, gravity bombs, or heavy penetrators (like the GBU-57 MOP for stealth bombers). Because neither B-1Bs nor B-2s can deploy a cargo-extracted weapon like the MOAB, S.A.C.-heritage bomber bases have no operational requirement to store it.

Forward Staging Bases for C-130 / MC-130 Assets for Middle East Operations:

In the event of operations requiring heavy cargo-airdrop munitions or specialized infiltration assets in the Middle East, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) rely on a network of established forward-operating locations that possess the ramp space, logistics support, and maintenance infrastructure required for C-130/MC-130 variants:

In the Persian Gulf / Arabian Peninsula (GCC Host Nations):

Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar): One of the largest and most critical U.S. air hubs in the Middle East, frequently hosting heavy airlift, refueling, and special operations assets.

Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates): Houses persistent U.S. Air Force fighter, reconnaissance, and-air mobility elements capable of staging regional sorties.

Ali Al Salem Air Base (Kuwait): A primary tactical airlift and logistics hub for intra-theater troop and cargo movements.

In the Eastern Mediterranean / Levant Region:

Incirlik Air Base (Turkey): A major NATO/U.S. aerial staging base positioned near the northern Middle East theater, providing immediate geographic proximity.

King Abdullah Air Base / Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Jordan): Vital regional partner installations frequently utilized for contingency staging, tactical air mobility, and expeditionary deployments.

Strategic Depth Locations:

Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia: Located further south in the Indian Ocean, it serves as a secure fallback heavy-bomber and long-range logistics staging area, though it is too distant for standard tactical C-130 low-altitude or direct airdrop missions without extensive intermediate staging.

None of the major U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forward operating bases in the region are permanently non-operational. While several key facilities—including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates—have sustained structural damage, localized hits to radar domes, and hangar impacts from regional missile and drone exchanges, repair and mitigation efforts take place rapidly to restore functionality.

Rather than being permanently shut down, the operational posture of these bases is managed through a combination of rapid reconstruction, active air-defense reinforcement, and the dispersal of high-value assets:

Operational Status and Repairs: U.S. and host-nation engineering teams routinely execute rapid runway, facility, and communications repairs following kinetic strikes. Critical command-and-control nodes, radar infrastructure (such as radomes), and support hangars are prioritized for immediate restoration to maintain regional deterrence and air-space monitoring.

Tactical Adaptation (Dispersal over Abandonment): To mitigate vulnerability against persistent missile and drone threats, CENTCOM frequently rotates and decentralizes aircraft and personnel. Rather than abandoning vital hubs like Al Udeid or Al Dhafra, forces are actively spread across secondary regional strips and partner locations to ensure mission continuity even while base repairs are underway.

Can the U.S. bomb its way to a favorable outcome using the MOAB in Iran?

No, military analysts and Pentagon officials broadly agree the MOAB cannot fulfill the primary objective of neutralizing Iran’s strategic infrastructure.

Not a Bunker Buster: The MOAB explodes above the surface. It is the exact opposite of a deep-penetration weapon like the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP).
Ineffective Against Mountain Facilities: Strategic assets, such as the Fordow enrichment site or the Fordow/Qods "Pickaxe Mountain" facilities, are buried up to 100 meters deep under solid granite.
What is the Best Case Scenario from the U.S. Military Raining MOAB's Down all across Iran:? At best, a MOAB could collapse exposed tunnel entries or surface facilities, but it cannot touch the underground infrastructure.
Delivery Limitations: The MOAB cannot be carried by stealth bombers or fighter jets. It must be dropped from the cargo hold of an unstealthy C-130 Hercules transport plane, meaning it can only be used in airspace where the U.S. has absolute air supremacy.

Why does the media leak "confidential" war plans?

In modern asymmetrical conflicts, structured "leaks" regarding devastating options like the MOAB serve a calculated psychological purpose.

Leaking a potential high-intensity conventional blitz is often used to signal an extreme willingness to escalate, forcing a state actor to the negotiating table or testing the diplomatic waters without committing to an attack.

The Tactical Pivot to Diego Garcia & Base Reallocation:

The Strategic Retreat from Frontline Bases:

The active war with Iran has fundamentally rewritten conventional Western power projection in the Persian Gulf. Iran's dense stockpiles of precision ballistic missiles, loitering munitions, and anti-ship cruise missiles effectively placed standard U.S. frontline bases within the Middle East directly inside highly accurate strike envelopes.

To protect capital naval ships and logistical hubs, the U.S. Navy (USN) and Air Force have had to retreat significantly outside the immediate Persian Gulf area, shifting core long-range bombardment and aerial operations to more secure, isolated territories.

                  [ PERSIAN GULF ] <========================+
                         ||                                 |
                         || (Frontline bases vulnerable     | Long-range B-52
                         ||  to drone/missile envelopes)    | & B-1 bomber sorties
                         \/                                 | require intensive
                 [ ARABIAN SEA ]                            | midair refueling
                         ||                                 |
                         \/                                 |
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~                  |
           ~ ~ ~ ~  INDIAN OCEAN  ~ ~ ~ ~                   |
           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~                  |
                         ||                                 |
                         \/                                 |
               [ DIEGO GARCIA BASE ] =======================+
                 (Approx. 3,800–4,000 km from Iran)

Moving Operations to Diego Garcia

Distance to Iran: The joint U.S.-UK base at Diego Garcia, an atoll in the central Indian Ocean, is located roughly 3,800 to 4,000 kilometers (approx. 2,400 to 2,500 miles) from Iran’s southern shores.
The Cost of Distance: Running operations from this distance strips the U.S. of rapid tactical flexibility. Flying strategic bombers like the B-52H or B-1 Lancer from Diego Garcia to targets in Iran requires a grueling 5 to 5.5-hour one-way flight that mandates intensive, highly expensive midair aerial refueling tanker support.
The Expanding Iranian Reach: In March 2026, Iran shocked Western intelligence by firing two long-range Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) targeting Diego Garcia. Though one failed in flight and the other was intercepted by a USN warship's SM-3 interceptor, the attempt demonstrated that Iran possesses an undeclared 4,000 km reach, invalidating the historical assumption that Diego Garcia was fully immune to retaliation.

Brookings: Which Path to Persia's? Results thus-far:

Geopolitical Winners, Losers, and American Taxpayers, Inflationary Costs:

Factor	Western Alliance (U.S., Israel, GCC)	Opposing Bloc (Iran, Russia, China)
Financial & Base Costs	Hundreds of billions expended across direct munitions, support to allies (Israel/GCC), and repairing/relocating pulverized or vulnerable Persian Gulf forward bases.	Low-cost asymmetrical defense. Millions spent on drone production neutralizing billions in Western defense infrastructure.
Energy Supply Chains	Heavy defensive costs to keep the Strait of Hormuz open; spiking global transport insurance rates.	Russia and China secure deep discounts on crude oil bypassing Western control through direct Eurasian pipeline and dark-fleet corridors.
Asymmetrical Attrition	Conventional military power (expensive air superior fighters, multi-billion dollar carrier strike groups) is bottlenecked by saturation anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) tactics.	Iran's decentralized proxy networks and deep subterranean manufacturing keep state mechanisms insulated from precision bombing.

Why Israel remains bogged down in Gaza

The conflict in Gaza remains unresolved due to the high density of urban warfare and an expansive underground tunnel grid. These structural factors neutralize the effectiveness of heavy stand-off aerial bombardment, binding large quantities of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) assets down in localized clearing actions while the regional theater scales upward.

Global Macroeconomic Fallout; and Localized Long-Term Survival:

Impact on the U.S. Dollar (USD)

Sustained, multi-trillion-dollar logistical operations abroad directly degrade the purchasing power of the domestic fiat currency:

Deficit Spending: Funding multi-theater packages for allies and base relocations forces intensive treasury issuance, compounding the national debt.
Supply-Driven Inflation: Energy interruptions in the Middle East drive up the price of oil, causing an instantaneous spike in shipping costs, consumer goods, food, and industrial manufacturing globally.

Personal Survival Strategies:

If geopolitical unrest yields acute supply shocks or infrastructure stress domestically, the best long-term preparatory frameworks center on tangible resilience rather than panic:

Financial Hedging: Pivot away from pure cash dependencies by maintaining short-term liquid reserves, real estate, and hard commodity assets to withstand ongoing inflationary baselines.
Decentralized Utilities: Invest in home-scale energy infrastructure, such as solar arrays with battery backup walls, or dual-fuel generators to remain independent of localized power grid fluctuations.
Supply Chain Buffers: Build a rotating 3-to-6-month deep pantry of shelf-stable whole foods and secure secondary, local water filtration options.